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The public goods game (PGG) is an economic game that
is frequently used to measure human cooperation and
free-riding behavior. Various empirical studies over two
decades have addressed the emergence of cooperation and
the gradual propagation of free-riding. However, most of
the models in the previous studies did not investigate the
interactions between and dynamics of cognitive motiva-
tions. The aim of the current study was to investigate the
dynamic interaction between the opposing cognitive moti-
vations underlying free-riding and cooperation during
repeated trials.
We used a computational model that simulates iterative
threshold PGG with binary decision-making under three
different conditions. Our model consisted of a cognitive
process component that encodes multiple forms of objec-
tive information, an affective process component that
encodes internal states (fear, greed, and social well-being),
and a random shifting component.
The individual loss and gain attitudes of the agent
determined the initial and converged free-riding ratios.
We observed that conditional cooperation established
distinguishable free-riding patterns between conditions
and that the random shifting component mimicked the
frequent shifting of human behavior. Furthermore, this
model could be extended to a schizophrenia-like model
by adjusting the integration of loss information and social
well-being learning rates.
Conclusions
We conclude that individual gain/loss attitudes, condi-
tional cooperation, and random shifting, the components
included in our model as non-objective information, are
required to explain local and global strategic free-riding
decision patterns.
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